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§18.1 I. Introduction
This chapter summarizes the provisions of federal and California law that are
implicated by reductions in force (RIFs), plant closings, and plant relocations.
Two statutes that come into play under such circumstances are the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) (29 USC §§2101–2109)
and the California-specific mass layoff provisions of Lab C §§1400–1408.
See §§18.20–18.44. If the employer’s workforce is organized, provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act (29 USC §§141–187) are relevant. See
§§18.57–18.74. If the workforce reduction or plant closing is necessitated by
the employer’s failing financial health, bankruptcy issues must be considered.
See §§18.75–18.84. Finally, a RIF often brings in its wake employee claims
of discrimination, particularly age discrimination. Senior members of the
workforce may be protected by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of
1990 (OWBPA) (Pub L 101–433, 104 Stat 978). See §§18.3–18.10. In preparing
for and dealing with litigation following a RIF, plant closing, or plant relocation,
the employer should give each of these subjects careful consideration.
§18.2 II. Planning a Reduction in Force
Unlike plant closures or relocations, which generally do not raise discrimination
issues because they have equal impact across the workforce, reductions in force
require employers to make decisions that affect some, but not all, employees.
Consequently, some employees selected for adverse employment action may
bring discrimination claims alleging that such action was taken because of
a characteristic protected under federal or California law. See chap 15 on
discrimination claims. Careful planning can avoid violations and prevent lawsuits.
A legitimate RIF must be based on the elimination of positions and not
of particular employees. See Washington v Garrett (9th Cir PAGE 16811993)
10 F3d 1421, 1429. An employer that attempts to use a RIF as a subterfuge
for the termination of “problem” employees risks violating federal and state
discrimination laws and breaching contractual obligations.To minimize liability,
an employer planning a RIF, corporate reorganization, or downsizing should
engage in a systematic review of its workforce composition and consider the
steps set forth in §§18.3–18.19.
A. Consider Alternatives to Layoff and
Termination
§18.3 1. Offering Incentives for Voluntary Termination
An employer planning a reduction in force should consider offering alternatives
to involuntary terminations in exchange for a release of all claims. Such alternatives
typically take the form of incentives such as the following:
• Early retirement plans;
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• Severance plans; and
• Enhanced benefit plans.
There is no prohibition against offering a more favorable severance plan to
employees who sign releases or waivers of claims (for example, 12 weeks of
severance pay to employees who sign, versus 2 weeks of pay to those who do not).
Such incentives to voluntary termination do not violate the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) (29 USC §§621–634), as long as they:
• Are implemented in a nondiscriminatory fashion;
• Are not intended to avoid the dictates of the ADEA; and
• Do not require the involuntary retirement of employees based on their age.
See 29 USC §623(f)(2)(B).
WARNINGØAn employee who is pressured or coerced into leaving employment
may later claim “constructive discharge” under California law. See §§17.29–17.33.
To avoid this situation, employers should stress the voluntariness of the plan,
allow employees a reasonable time to consider the plan, and encourage employees
to consult with human resources personnel if they have questions.
a. Releases and Waivers of Claims
§18.4 (1) Basic Requirements for Standard Waiver
Under both federal and state law, a waiver of rights must be knowing and
voluntary, as determined by the totality of the circumstances. See Stroman v West
Coast Grocery Co. (9th Cir 1989) 884 F2d 458, 462; Allen v California Toll Bridge
Auth. (1977) 68 CA3d 340, 369, 137 CR 493. Fraud, duress, or coercion in
connection with the execution of a waiver may render it void.
WARNINGØA general release is inadequate to waive claims unknown to the
employee at the time of execution of the release that would materially affect
the consent. See CC §1542; see also Adams v Philip Morris, Inc. (6th Cir 1995)
67 F3d 580.The release must evidence a specific intent to waive claims that
the employee does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor.
§18.5 (2) Requirements for Waiver by Employees Age 40 and Over:
OWBPA
The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (OWBPA) (Pub L 101–433,
104 Stat 978), amending the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) (29 USC §§621–634), sets forth specific requirements for enforceable
releases of ADEA claims. 29 USC §626(f). A waiver and release of such claims
under the OWBPA must be knowing and voluntary. A waiver may not be
considered “knowing and voluntary” unless, at a minimum (29 USC §626(f)(1)):
• The waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer
that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by the individual, or
by the average individual eligible to participate; See Syverson v. International
Business Machines Corp. (9th Cir 2006)461 F.3d 1147, (holding an employee’s
release agreement was unenforceable as to federal age discrimination claims
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because the covenant not to sue was “commingled” with the release of claims,
and therefore was held to be confusing to a lay person; which is prohibited
in a release of ADEA claims);
• The waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under the ADEA;
• The individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date
the waiver is executed;
• The individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in
addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled;
• The individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney before
executing the agreement;
• The individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider
the agreement (note that the 21-day period may be extended to 45 days
when the waiver is requested as part of an exit incentive or other employment
termination program offered to a group or class of employees—see §18.6);
and
• The agreement may be revoked for up to 7 days after it is executed, and
does not become effective until the 7 days have expired.
Because the statute does not specify how an employee may revoke his or her
acceptance, the employer may wish to set forth a procedure in the release
itself. NOTEØ An employer may wish to delay payment of the release
consideration until the 7-day period has passed to avoid the time and expense
of payment recovery if the agreement is revoked.
Additional requirements apply when the waiver is part of a termination program
offered to a group or class of employees. See §18.6.
NOTEØThere is no requirement that older workers receive more consideration
than younger workers in exchange for a general release, even though only
the older workers waive ADEA claims. See Griffin v Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc.
(11th Cir 1995) 62 F3d 368, 374; DiBiase v Smithkline Beecham Corp.
(3d Cir 1995) 48 F3d 719.
§18.6 (3) Waiver for Group RIF
Special rules apply when the waiver is requested from an employee age 40 or
over “in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination
program offered to a group or class of employees.” 29 USC §626(f)(1). Instead of
the 21 days within which the individual employee can consider the agreement
(see §18.5), 45 days are allotted to the employee who is part of a group or class.
Moreover, the employer—in addition to having to comply with the requirements
of a standard waiver—must inform the individual in writing as to:
• Any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such a program;
• Any eligibility factors for the program and any time limits for applying for
it; and
• The job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program
within the portion of the employer’s organization from which eligible
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employees were chosen (i.e., the “decisional unit”) and the ages of all
individuals in the same decisional unit who are not eligible or selected for
the program. 29 CFR §1625.22.
NOTEØThe age statistics required to be provided with releases of age
discrimination claims under the OWBPA are limited to the decisional unit
considered for the discharged employees.The decisional unit is defined
by the portion of the employer’s organizational structure from which the
employer chose the persons who would be offered consideration for the
signing of a waiver and those who would not be offered consideration for
the signing of a waiver. See Burlison v McDonald’s Corp. (11th Cir 2006) 455
F3d 1242.The information the employer must provide regarding job titles
and ages may include information concerning employees outside a single
facility. Griffin v Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. (11th Cir 1995) 62 F3d 368.
NOTEØEmployers should use caution to ensure that the age statistics appendix
is accurate and unambiguous, otherwise, there is a risk that a court will find
the release invalid as to ADEA claims. There are a few reported decisions
that hold employers to an extremely high standard with regard to the format
and information contained in the release. See Pagliolo v. Guidant Corp.
(D. MN 2007), 483 F. Supp. 2d 847 (holding that the release failed to satisfy
the OWBPA requirements because (i) the age appendix included employees
who were redeployed within the company, which constituted a material
misrepresentation, (ii) it failed to disclose the decisional units involved in
the layoff, (iii) it failed to identify the eligibility factors used in determining
employees selected for layoff, and (iv) it failed to adhere to formatting
requirements with regard to age and job titles, therefore, the release was
held to be void as to age claims). See also Peterson, et. al. v. Seagate US LLC
(D. MN 2008) 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42179), (invalidating a release and
holding that the release did not satisfy OWBPA requirements because it
reported 154 employees were terminated when only 152 employees were,
and because it did not clearly list the title and job codes of the employee
groups).
§18.7 (a) No Ratification of Voidable Releases
It used to be an open question in the Ninth Circuit whether an employee
whose release did not comply with the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
of 1990 (OWBPA) may subsequently ratify it, e.g., by continuing to accept
benefits from the employer. Other circuit courts of appeal were split on this
question. Compare Blakeney v Lomas Info. Sys., Inc. (5th Cir 1995) 65 F3d 482
(noncompliance with OWBPA rendered release voidable, but employees ratified
by retaining severance pay), and O’Shea v Commercial Credit Corp. (4th Cir 1991)
930 F2d 358 (recognizing ratification of ADEA release before OWBPA), with
Oberg v Allied Van Lines, Inc. (7th Cir 1993) 11 F3d 679 (noncompliance rendered
release void; retaining consideration could not ratify release).
The Supreme Court has resolved the issue in favor of the employee. In Oubre v
Entergy Operations, Inc. (1998) 522 US 422, 139 L Ed 2d 849, 118 S Ct 838, the
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Supreme Court held that the employee’s failure to return benefits received in
consideration for releasing ADEA claims does not ratify a waiver that does not
comply with the OWBPA. See also 29 CFR §1625.23.
§18.8 (b) Form: Release
18.8–1 Release
To: _ _[Name of employee age 40 and over]_ _
Dear _ _[name of employee]_ _:
This letter is to confirm our agreement with respect to the termination of your employment
with _ _[name of employer]_ _. To ensure that there are no ambiguities, this letter first
explains in detail both your rights and obligations and those of _ _ [name of employer]_ _
on termination of your employment. If, in exchange for a Release, you wish to accept
additional benefits to which you would otherwise not be entitled, indicate your agreement
by signing, dating, and returning this letter to me by _ _[date; no less than 21 days for
individual or 45 days for group termination]_ _.
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
Your employment with _ _[name of employer]_ _ will end effective _ _[date]_ _. Thereafter,
you will no longer be an employee of _ _[name of employer]_ _. You will be paid _ _[dollar
amount]_ _, which constitutes all earned and unpaid salary together with any accrued and
unused vacation pay, less deductions required or permitted by law in your final paycheck on
_ _[last day of employment]_ _.
In addition, you will receive _ _[describe any other benefits to which employee is entitled]
_ _. You also may _ _[insert COBRA conversion rights language/ refer to letter that will be
provided]_ _. _ _[Describe briefly any applicable vested pension benefits/refer to summary
that will be provided.]_ _ Please return all company property to _ _[e.g., human resources
manager]_ _ by _ _[date]_ _.
In addition to the foregoing to which you are entitled, _ _[name of employer]_ _ is prepared
to offer you additional benefits to which you would otherwise not be entitled in exchange
for an agreement to release all claims known or unknown against _ _[name of employer]
_ _, its affiliates, past, present, and future officers, directors, shareholders, agents,
employees, attorneys, insurers, successors, and assigns. If you wish to accept such
additional benefits in consideration for the Release, your signature at the conclusion of
this letter will reflect your agreement. Before signing the Release, which is set forth below,
you are advised to consult an attorney. You may take _ _[21/45]_ _ days from receipt of
this letter (i.e., until _ _[date]_ _) to consider whether you wish to accept these additional
benefits in exchange for the Release. Please also note that even if you do sign the Release,
you may change your mind and revoke the Release and forego the additional benefits,
provided you notify _ _[designate individual]_ _ in writing within seven (7) days of your
signing that you no longer want the additional benefits described below.
__[Signature]__
_ _[Title]_ _
RELEASE
This release is given in consideration of _ _[name of employer’s]_ _ additional payment
of _ _[dollar amount]_ _, less deductions authorized or required by law _ _[plus company
contributions for medical benefits and pension enhancement] _ _. This sum shall be paid
in a lump sum, single payment ten (10) days after my termination date or ten (10) days
after the Company’s receipt of this signed unrevoked Release Agreement, whichever
is later.
I understand that these are additional benefits for which I am not eligible unless I elect to
sign this Release Agreement.
Released Claims
In consideration of these additional benefits, I, on behalf of my heirs, spouse, and assigns,
hereby completely release and forever discharge _ _[name of employer]_ _ (Company)
from any and all claims, of any and every kind, nature, and character, known or unknown,
foreseen or unforeseen, based on any act or omission occurring before the date of my
signing this Release Agreement, including any claims arising out of my offer of employment,
my employment, or termination of my employment with the Company. The matters released
include any claims under federal, state, or local laws, including claims arising under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) as amended by the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), and any common-law tort, contract, or statutory claims,
and any claims for attorney fees and costs.
I understand and agree that this Release Agreement extinguishes all claims, whether
known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, except for those claims not released as
expressly described below. I expressly waive any rights or benefits under Section 1542 of
the California Civil Code, or any equivalent statute. California Civil Code Section 1542
provides as follows:
“A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect
to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her
must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.”
I fully understand that if any fact with respect to any matter covered by this Release
Agreement is found hereafter to be other than or different from the facts now believed by
me to be true, I expressly accept and assume that this Release Agreement shall be and
remain effective, notwithstanding such difference in the facts.
Claims Not Released
The only claims not released through this Release Agreement are any claims that cannot
be released by law, such as claims for unemployment benefits, workers’ compensation, or
claims relating to the validity of this Release Agreement under the ADEA as amended by
the OWBPA.
Enforcement of This Release Agreement
I also understand and agree that if any suit, affirmative defense, or counterclaim is brought
to enforce the provisions of this Release Agreement, with the exception of a claim brought by
me regarding the validity of this Release Agreement under the ADEA as amended by
the OWBPA, the prevailing party shall be entitled to its costs, expenses, and attorney
fees as well as any and all other remedies specifically authorized under the law.
Miscellaneous
This Release Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between myself and the Company
with respect to any matters referred to in this Release Agreement. This Release Agreement
supersedes any and all of the other agreements between myself and the Company _ _
[, except for _ _[name of policy that is not superseded by this agreement]_ _, attached
hereto as Attachment 2, which remains in full force and effect]_ _. No other consideration,
agreements, representations, oral statements, understandings, or course of conduct that
are not expressly set forth in this Release Agreement should be implied or are binding.
I am not relying upon any other agreement, representation, statement, omission, understanding,
or course of conduct that is not expressly set forth in this Release Agreement. I understand
and agree that this Release Agreement shall not be deemed or construed at any time or
for any purposes as an admission of any liability or wrongdoing by either myself or the
Company. I also agree that if any provision of this agreement is deemed invalid, the
remaining provisions will still be given full force and effect. The terms and conditions of
this agreement and release will be interpreted and construed in accordance with the laws
of California.
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Before execution of this Release Agreement, I have gathered sufficient relevant information
to exercise my own judgment. The Company has informed me in writing to consult an
attorney before signing this Agreement, if I wish. The Company has also given me at least
_ _[21/45]_ _ days in which to consider this Release Agreement, if I wish. I also understand
that for a period of seven (7) days after I sign this Release Agreement I may revoke this
Release Agreement and that the Release Agreement will not become effective until seven
(7) days from my unrevoked signature.
I have read this Release Agreement and understand all of its terms. I further acknowledge
and agree that this Release Agreement is executed voluntarily and with full knowledge of
its legal significance.
I expressly agree that this Release Agreement becomes effective on my last day of
employment or upon my timely signing of this Release Agreement, whichever is later.
Finally, I agree that I will not disclose voluntarily (except to my spouse, accountant, or
lawyer) or allow anyone else to disclose either the existence of, reason for, or contents of
this Release Agreement without the Company’s prior written consent, unless required to
do so by law.
EMPLOYEE’S ACCEPTANCE OF RELEASE
I have read the foregoing and understand, approve, and voluntarily agree to the terms of
the Release in exchange for the additional benefits to which I would otherwise not be
entitled.
Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ __[Employee’s signature]__
18.8–2 Optional addition to 18.8–1: Benefit enrichment for worker
age 40 or over terminated in group RIF
Before I signed this Release Agreement, the Company advised me (1) that all employees
laid off as a result of the _ _[specify date]_ _ reduction in force have been given an
opportunity to enrich their termination benefits in exchange for a Release Agreement, and
that no such employee has been given more consideration for executing the Release
Agreement in less than 45 days, and (2) of all individuals by job title and age in the
same job classification or organizational unit who have been selected for layoff, and the
job title and ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who
were not selected for layoff. A complete list of these individuals by job title and age is
attached hereto as Attachment 1.
Comment: The above is one example of a release for an employee age 40 or over.
Employers are strongly advised, however, to consult with counsel regarding
the proper language and tone of the release, which may vary depending on the
employee, the employment action, the benefits the employer provides, whether
the employee has commenced litigation, and whether the employee is represented
by counsel. Form 18.8–2 should be included if the employee is a worker age
40 or over facing termination under a group RIF (see §18.6). For discussion of
COBRA rights, see §18.45.
§18.9 b. Claims Not Subject to Waiver
Although an employee can knowingly and intelligently waive most federal and
state claims, the following may not be waived:
• The right to file a charge or participate in an investigation or proceeding
conducted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (29 USC
§626(f)(4));
NOTE ØA waiver in settlement of an action filed either with the EEOC or in
court must comply with the requirements set forth in §§18.4–18.8, but the
individual need be given only a reasonable period of time within which to
consider the settlement agreement. 29 USC §626(f)(2).
• Claims for wages indisputably due (Lab C §206.5);
• Claims under the workers’ compensation law, unless approved by the Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board or referee (Lab C §5001);
• Claims for state unemployment benefits (Un Ins C §1342).
• Claims arising under the FLSA, unless approved by the Department of
Labor or a court (see Barrentine v Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. (1981) 450
US 728, 67 L Ed 2d 641, 101 S Ct 1437; D.A. Schulte, Inc. v Gangi (1946)
328 US 108, 90 L Ed 1114, 66 S Ct 925);
• Claims challenging the validity of a release under the OWBPA (29 CFR
§1625.23(b));
• Claims arising under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); and
• Claims arising under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) (38 U.S.C. § 4301; Perez v. Uline, Inc.
(CA 4th 2007) 157 Cal. App. 4th 953).
NOTEØThere is a split of authority among the circuits about whether FMLA
claims can be released without court approval. See 29 CFR §825.220(d);
Taylor v Progress Energy, Inc. (4th Cir 2005) PAGE 1691415 F3d 364 (FMLA
release invalid). But see Butler v. Merrill Lynch Business Financial Services, Inc.
(N.D. IL 2008) 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63996; Faris v Williams WPC-I, Inc.
(5th Cir 2003) 332 F3d 316 (FMLA release allowable).
§18.10 c. Tax Issues in Releasing ADEA and Title VII Claims
Whether settlement payment to the employee and payment to his or her
counsel are subject to tax deductions, and how it is reported and to whom
(e.g., a Form W2 or 1099) are likely to be areas of negotiation. Generally, if the
amount paid to an employee is not for physical injury, it will be subject to
deductions just like a wage payment and should be reported on a W2. If the
payment is made without deductions, but it is questionable whether there was a
“physical injury,” a hold harmless and indemnification agreement in favor of the
employer should be included in the release that becomes effective, in the event
a taxing authority later determines withholdings should have been made.
If a payment is made directly to the employee’s counsel for attorney fees and
costs, it nevertheless should be reported on a Form 1099 to both the employee
and the employee’s counsel (i.e., they both receive a 1099 for the portion of
attorney fees and costs paid). See Treas Reg 1.6041–1(f); 26 USC §6045(f).
§18.11 2. Transfers, Bumping, and Recall
In the absence of a contractual obligation, an employer has no duty to transfer
an employee whose position is eliminated as a result of a reduction in force.
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v Thurston (1985) 469 US 111, 83 L Ed 2d 523, 105 S
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Ct 613; Rose v Wells Fargo & Co. (9th Cir 1990) 902 F2d 1417, 1422. Nor does
the law impose an obligation on an employer to bump or recall employees
when the employer has not obligated itself to do so by contract and does not
maintain a practice or policy of doing so. See Pfeifer v United States Shoe Corp.
(CD Cal 1987) 676 F Supp 969, 973; Cox v Resilient Flooring Div. of Congoleum
Corp. (CD Cal 1986) 638 F Supp 726, 734. (“Bump” is a labor term of art that
allows senior people who are transferred or who have their positions eliminated
to “bump” junior people from their positions. In re United Press Int’l, Inc. (Bankr
SD NY 1991) 134 BR 507, 510.) If an employer transfers some employees
and not others, however, it must be able to justify its selection. See Jackson v
Shell Oil Co. (9th Cir 1983) 702 F2d 197. A presumption of discrimination is
raised when the employee can show that others outside the protected class
were treated more favorably. See Rose v Wells Fargo & Co. (9th Cir 1990) 902 F2d
1417, 1422.
If an employer elects to adopt a recall policy, it should clearly identify the
nature and scope of its obligations to avoid later claims of discrimination or
breach of contract. See Sakellar v Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (9th Cir 1985)
765 F2d 1453.The policy should set forth:
• The time period in which recall rights may be exercised;
• How recall rights are triggered, e.g., automatically or by employee application;
• The position(s) for which the employee may be recalled; and
• What qualifications are relevant, i.e., whether the policy requires the
employer merely to consider the employee for the position, to give the
employee a preference over outsiders, or to hire the employee without
regard to the qualification of other applicants.
B. Establish Selection Criteria for
Termination
§18.12 1. Neutral Criteria
An employer that can show it selected certain employees for termination based
on neutral criteria will have a strong defense against a discrimination claim.
Many employers use a procedure in which they identify specific factors relevant
to an employee’s performance and status, assign particular weights to those
factors, and then release employees with the lowest weighted score. See, e.g.,
Martin v Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 CA4th 1718, 35 CR2d 181
(granting summary judgment on California Fair Employment and Housing Act
discrimination claim where employer identified lowest-scoring employees
based on annual performance ratings and used a specially weighted performance
rating giving more credit to senior employees); Coburn v Pan Am.World Airways, Inc.
(DC Cir 1983) 711 F2d 339, 342 (affirming judgment notwithstanding verdict
on Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim where Pan Am used numerical
ranking system and evaluated personnel on basis of qualifications, abilities,
productivity, and length of service with additional credit to employees over 40).
NOTEØ Employees who are out on pregnancy leave or leave under the Family
and Medical Leave Act (29 USC §§2601–2654) or California’s Family Rights
Act (Govt C §12945.2) are not entitled to any greater rights to reinstatement
or other benefits of employment in a reduction in force than if they had
been continuously employed. See 29 CFR §§825.216(a), 1604.10(b);
2 Cal Code Regs §§7291.9(c)(1), 7297.2(c).
2. Typical Criteria for Retaining or Laying Off
Employees
§18.13 a. Merit
One of the most common criteria in selecting employees for layoff or termination
is performance.The evaluation of performance, however, should be based as
much as possible on objective criteria applied in a uniform way. Inclusion of
subjective factors does not, per se, violate any laws (Sengupta v Morrison-Knudsen Co.
(9th Cir 1986) 804 F2d 1072, 1075), but may bolster a statistical showing of
discrimination or support a showing that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory
reason for selecting an employee is pretextual. Gay v Waiters’& Dairy Lunchmen’s
Union, Local No. 30 (9th Cir 1982) 694 F2d 531, 554. An employer may wish
to consider only the more recent evaluations or give those special weight.
§18.14 b. Versatility
In a shrinking workforce, versatility often becomes an important criterion. An
employee’s ability to perform multiple tasks in a consolidation is often a heavily
weighted factor. See Sirvidas v Commonwealth Edison Co. (7th Cir 1995) 60 F3d
375, 379; Ingels v Thiokol Corp. (10th Cir 1994) 42 F3d 616, 623; compare
Coleman v Quaker Oats Co. (9th Cir 2000) 232 F3d 1271.
§18.15 c. Seniority
Seniority may be used as a criterion in decisions concerning retention or layoff.
However, the employer’s seniority system may not be invoked in such a way as
to circumvent protections under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act or
Title VII, both of which provide that an employer may select employees for adverse
employment action according to a bona fide seniority system. 29 USC
§623(f)(2) (ADEA); 42 USC §2000e–2(h) (Title VII).
Seniority systems are typically contained in collective bargaining agreements
governing unionized employees, but nonunionized employers also may adopt
such systems consistent with International Bhd. of Teamsters v U.S. (1977) 431 US
324, 52 L Ed 2d 396, 97 S Ct 1843. Many employers, however, prefer to use a
meritocracy system and provide that seniority is to be considered only in the
event that all other factors are equal.
WARNINGØWhile targeting the least senior employees for termination or
layoff minimizes ADEA claims, it may lead to other discrimination claims if
it adversely impacts women and minorities who have recently entered the
workforce as part of an affirmative action plan.
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§18.16 d. Salary
The decision to select employees for layoffs based on their salaries may lead to
age discrimination claims if older workers are adversely affected. Government
Code §12941 explicitly provides that “the use of salary as the basis for differentiating
between employees when terminating employment may be found to constitute
age discrimination if use of that criterion adversely impacts older workers as
a group.”
§18.17 3. Prohibited Criteria
Employers that attempt to use a reduction in force to eliminate “problem”
employees rather than job positions expose themselves to significant liability.
It is unlawful to select an employee for adverse employment action for any
of the following reasons:
• Age (29 USC §§621–634 (ADEA); Govt C §12940(a) (FEHA));
• Sex, race, color, religion, or national origin (42 USC §2000e–2(a) (Title VII);
Govt C §12940(a) (FEHA));
• Pregnancy (42 USC §2000e(k); Govt C §§12926(p), 12940(a));
• Gender and gender identity (Govt C §§12926(p), 12940(a); Pen C §422.56);
• Marital status (Govt C §12940(a); 29 CFR §1604.4);
• Sexual orientation (Govt C §12940(a));
• Ancestry (Govt C §12940(a));
• Military Service (Mil & V C § 394; 38 USC §§4301-4333);
• A pension about to vest (29 USC §1140 (ERISA §510));
• Disability (42 USC §12112 (ADA); Govt C §12940(a);
• Medical condition (Govt C §§12926(h), 12940(a));
• Injury in the course of employment or filing a claim for workers’
compensation (Lab C §132a);
• The employee’s exercise of a protected right, such as filing a discrimination
claim or unfair labor practice charge, reporting a suspected violation of the
law, or acting as a witness in support of complaints of harassment (see Taylor
v City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power (2006) 144 CA4th 1216, 51 CR3d 206);
• Concerted activity (29 USC §151; Lab C §923);
• Whistleblowing (Lab C §§1102.5, 1103);
• Disclosing amount of wages (Lab C §232); or
• Disclosing working conditions (Lab C §232.5).
NOTEØAs applicable to publicly traded companies, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (Pub L 107–204, 116 Stat 745) prohibits a company, or any officer,
employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent, from discriminating against
(e.g., discharging, demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing) an employee
because of any lawful act done by the employee to provide information,
cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation
regarding any conduct that the employee reasonably believes constitutes
a violation of the securities laws or mail fraud, when the information
or assistance is provided to or the investigation is conducted by a federal
regulatory or law enforcement agency, any member or Committee of
Congress, or a person with supervisory authority over the employee.
18 USC §1514A. Additionally, it is a criminal offense (with individual
liability) for an employer to discriminate against an employee for reporting
“truthful information” relating to the commission of “any federal offense” to
a law enforcement agency. 18 USC §1513(e). Aside from the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, retaliation for whistleblowing (on a variety of matters, not just
those discussed here) is often actionable as a wrongful termination in
violation of public policy under California tort law.
Employers also should not use a RIF as a convenient excuse to bypass contractual
step discipline procedures. Such attempts to evade the employer’s normal
progressive discipline procedures may result in claims of breach of contract
and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, particularly if the
employee is subsequently replaced.
§18.18 C. Notice
In addition to the measures described in §§18.12–18.17 to ensure compliance
with federal and state civil rights statutes, an employer planning a reduction in
force, depending on its circumstances and magnitude, may need to provide
notice to its employees in compliance with the following:
• The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) (29 USC
§§1161–1169) (employer must notify group health plan administrator within
30 days after employees’ termination; administrator has 14 days thereafter
to notify affected employees; later notice periods may be prescribed by a
multiemployer group health plan in effect (29 USC §1166(a)(2), (c));
• Labor Code §2807 (employer must notify former employees of availability
of continued medical, surgical, or hospital benefits);
• The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) (29 USC
§§2101–2109) (see §§18.20–18.44) and California layoff provisions (Lab C
§§1400–1408);
• A collective bargaining agreement;
• An employment contract; or
• Personnel policy.
12
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§18.19 D. Checklist: RIF Guidelines for Minimizing
Litigation Risk
To avoid post-layoff claims, the following steps should guide the employer’s
implementation of a reduction in force:
___ 1. Articulate the business need and identify the business goal to be
accomplished.
___ 2. Determine whether the reduction in force can be avoided or
minimized by other cost-cutting measures such as salary or hiring
freezes, voluntary attrition through early retirement plans, severance
plans, enhanced benefit plans, or cutback in nonexempt hours.
___ 3. If a reduction in force is unavoidable, determine whether the reduction
should be limited to only identified departments, organizations, or
levels of managers, or be applied across-the-board.
___ 4. Once the affected units or levels have been determined, identify
the positions that need to be eliminated or consolidated. In some
situations, there may be only one incumbent. In other situations,
there may be several incumbents and, therefore, individuals must
be identified from the targeted positions.
___ 5. Set the criteria for selection. If criteria are weighted, articulate
the weighted formula.While subjectivity is not per se unlawful,
objective, weighted factors are the most defensible. If there is to
be bumping between departments or different sites, determine
the criteria for bumping. See §18.11 on “bumping.”
___ 6. Rank multiple incumbents under the stated criteria.The lowest-
ranked employees in the identified unit should ordinarily be the
employees who are laid off, absent extraordinary circumstances.
___ 7. After a tentative list of layoff candidates has been generated, check
the list for adverse impact by protected category such as race, sex,
national origin, disability, and age (by 5-year brackets starting at
the age of 40).Take a before-and-after “snapshot,” noting what
percentage of the workforce is in each category before the layoff
and after the proposed layoff. If the tentative layoff list appears to
disparately impact a protected group, re-analyze the selection
criteria to ensure that there is no subtle form of illegal discrimination.
___ 8. To ensure that the selection is based solely on legitimate business
reasons, review the tentative list for:
___ a. “Whistleblowers”;
___ b. Workers’ compensation claimants;
___ c. People about to vest in, e.g., stock options, retirement plans.
___ 9. Determine whether additional compensation should be provided
in exchange for a release of claims.
___ 10. Once the final determination has been made, ascertain whether
the RIF will trigger WARN (or the state counterpart) notice
requirements. See §§18.20–18.44.
___ 11. Provide COBRA notice (Lab C §2807; see §§18.45).
___ 12. Consider transition assistance such as outplacement.
___ 13. Provide managers with guidance on how to communicate
information to the workforce and how to manage the reduced
workforce after the RIF has taken effect.
III. Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act
(WARN)
§18.20 A. Background
In 1988, in response to the great number of plant closures and mass layoffs
through the 1980s, Congress passed the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (WARN) (29 USC §§2101–2109).The goal of the Act is to
assist employees and their families and communities in preparing for a plant
closure or mass layoff by requiring employers to provide advance notice of the
decision and imposing penalties for noncompliance.With certain qualifications
and exceptions discussed in §§18.32–18.36,WARN prohibits employers from
(29 USC §2102(a))
order[ing] a plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a 60-day period after
the employer serves written notice of such an order—
(1)to each representative of the affected employees as of the time of the notice
or, if there is no such representative at that time, to each affected employee;
and
(2)to the State or entity designated by the State to carry out rapid response
activities [the State dislocated worker unit]… and the chief elected official
of the unit of local government within which such closing or layoff is to
occur.
The Department of Labor has promulgated regulations interpreting WARN.
See 20 CFR §§639.1–639.10.
On September 21, 2002, California enacted AB 2957, effective January 1, 2003,
which provides for analogous state law notice for “mass layoffs, relocations, and
terminations.” Lab C §§1400–1408. For convenience, the Labor Code provisions
will be referred to in this chapter as “California WARN.”
14
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California WARN prohibits an employer from (Lab C §1401(a))
order[ing] a mass layoff, relocation, or termination at a covered establishment
unless, 60 days before the order takes effect, the employer gives written
notice of the order to the following:
(1)The employees of the covered establishment affected by the order.
(2)The Employment Development Department, the local workforce
investment board, and the chief elected official of each city and county
government within which the termination, relocation, or mass layoff
occurs.
Because California WARN is analogous to the federal WARN, it is discussed
below with the federal WARN requirements and definitions. Note, however,
that the statutes are separate and distinct from one another, and there are
important differences: California WARN applies to terminations at a “covered
establishment” (rather than a “single site of employment”), and applies in cases
of “mass layoff,” “relocation,” or “termination” (rather than “plant closing” or
“mass layoff ” under the federal WARN). As noted in the following sections, and
by way of example, California WARN defines a mass layoff as a layoff of 50
employees or more during a 30-day period, irrespective of whether the layoff
involves 33 percent of active employees. (See §18.27 about the 33-percent
requirement.) Additionally, whether there is a “relocation” and “termination” is
not dependent on a specific threshold number of employees being terminated.
§18.21 B. Covered Employers
The federal and California WARN apply to all employers with the threshold
number of employees defined in §§18.22–18.23. Employers under the federal
WARN include nonprofit organizations and public and quasi-public entities that
engage in business and are administered independently from the government.
The federal WARN statute does not apply to federal, state, or local governments
and federally recognized Indian tribal governments. 20 CFR §639.3(a).
1. Requisite Number of Employees
§18.22 a. Employees Counted
Employers to which the federal WARN applies are all business enterprises that
employ (29 USC §2101(a)(1)):
• 100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or
• 100 or more employees, including part-time employees, who in the aggregate
work 4000 or more hours per week, excluding overtime.
The number of employees is calculated as of the date the first notice is required
to be given. 20 CFR §639.5(a)(2). See §§18.30–18.41 on giving notice.A different
reference point may be used for entities using seasonal employees. See, e.g.,
Marques v Telles Ranch, Inc. (ND Cal 1994) 867 F Supp 1438, 1442 n3, aff’d
without opinion (9th Cir 1997) 133 F3d 927.
The employees who count toward the statute’s numerical threshold include:
• All workers employed for 20 or more hours per week or who have been
employed for 6 or more of the 12 months preceding the date on which
notice is required (29 USC §2101(a)(8); 20 CFR §639.3(h));
• Workers on temporary layoff or leave who have “a reasonable expectation of
recall,” i.e., who understand, through notification or industry practice, that
employment has been temporarily interrupted and that they will be recalled
to the same or a similar job (20 CFR §639.3(a));
• Workers (excluding part-time workers) who are otherwise exempt from
notice (20 CFR §639.3(a)).
For purposes of determining the number of employees that count towards the
numerical threshold for WARN applicability, it is important to be aware that
two companies may sometimes be considered one employer.Two former
companies constituted one employer for purposes of WARN Act notification
when one company with 88 employees acquired another with 18 employees,
and the first then suddenly shut down its mill and laid off all the employees,
while the other continued in business for several weeks, but then shut down
and laid off all of its employees. Childress v Darby Lumber, Inc. (9th Cir 2004) 357
F3d 1000.
California WARN applies to all “covered establishments.”A “covered establishment”
is defined as any industrial or commercial facility, or part of such facility, that
employs or has employed within the preceding 12 months (of the date on
which notice is required) 75 or more part-time or full-time employees. Lab
C §1400(a), (h).
§18.23 b. Employees Not Counted
The federal WARN does not count as “employees” part-time employees who
are employed (29 USC §2101(a)(8)):
• For fewer than 20 hours per week; or
• For fewer than 6 of the 12 preceding months from the date on which notice
is required.
The California WARN statute does not exclude part-time employees. It does,
however, exclude employees who are employed in seasonal employment when
they are hired with the understanding that their employment is seasonal and
temporary. Lab C §1400(g)(2).
§18.24 2. Application to Independent Contractors and
Subsidiaries
Under the federal WARN, whether independent contractors and subsidiaries
that are wholly or partly owned by a parent company count as separate
employers or as part of the parent or contracting company depends on their
independence from the parent or contracting company. Although Department
of Labor regulations list five factors relevant to this determination (see 20 CFR
16
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§639.3(a)(2)), they are intended only to summarize state and federal law, and
do not foreclose reliance on “single employer” factors under other statutes.
See International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,Warehousemen & Helpers v American
Delivery Serv. Co. (9th Cir 1995) 50 F3d 770, 775 (applying “single employer”
factors of WARN and the Labor Management Relations Act concurrently);
Wholesale & Retail Food Distrib. Local 63 v Santa Fe Terminal Servs., Inc. (CD Cal 1993)
826 F Supp 326, 334 (applying WARN factors and California corporation law).
The California WARN statute provides that a parent corporation is an employer
as to any covered establishment directly owned and operated by its subsidiary.
Lab C §1400(b).
§18.25 3. Application on Sale or Acquisition
Under the federal WARN, when all or part of a business is sold, the seller is the
employer up to and including the effective date of sale.Thereafter the purchaser
is the employer. See 29 USC §2101(b)(1); 20 CFR §639.4(c). See also International
Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees & Moving Picture Mach. Operators v Compact
Video Servs., Inc. (9th Cir 1995) 50 F3d 1464, 1467.
Unlike the federal WARN, the California statute does not include an express
exception for the sale of a business.To date, California has nevertheless interpreted
the California WARN statute consistently with the federal law in this regard.
See MacIsaac v Waste Mgmt. Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 CA4th 1076,
36 CR3d 650.
In cases involving the acquisition of a business by a secured creditor, bankruptcy
trustee, or other fiduciary, the entity is an employer only if it is responsible
for operating the business as a going concern. See Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers,
Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 572 v Weslock Corp. (9th Cir 1995) 66 F3d 241
(creditor who took control of business as collateral securing delinquent loan
is not employer when it exercises only degree of control necessary to preserve
business asset for liquidation or sale).
NOTEØ Determination that an enterprise is an “employer” for purposes of the
WARN Act does not necessarily qualify that enterprise as an employer under
any other law.
§18.26 C. Triggering Events
The notice requirements under the federal WARN are triggered by the
occurrence of:
• A plant closing; or
• A mass layoff.
See 29 USC §§2101(a)(2)–(3), 2102(a).
California WARN applies to the following job actions at a “covered establishment”
(Lab C §1401(a)):
• Termination;
• Mass layoff; and
• Relocation.
1. Definitions of “Plant Closing,” “Termination,”
and “Mass Layoff”
§18.27 a. Duration; Number of Employees Affected
“Plant closing” under the federal WARN statute means the permanent or
temporary shutdown of a single site of employment or a facility or operating
unit within “a single site of employment” that results in (29 USC §2101(a)(2)):
• An “employment loss” at the single site of employment during any 30-day
period, for
• 50 or more employees (excluding part-time employees).
See Bader v Northern Line Layers. Inc. (9th Cir 2007) 503 F3d 813 for a discussion of
what constitutes a “single site of employment.” See §18.29 on “employment loss.”
California WARN does not address “plant closings.” Rather, it addresses
“terminations” and “relocations.” A “termination” is defined as the cessation
or “substantial cessation” of industrial or commercial operations in a covered
establishment. Lab C §1400(f). “Relocation” is defined as the removal of all or
substantially all of industrial or commercial operations to a different location
100 miles away or more. Lab C §1400(e). In contrast with federal WARN’s
definition of “plant closing,” there is no specific numerical threshold under
California WARN to trigger a “termination” or “relocation.”
“Mass layoff ” under the federal WARN means a reduction in force (other than
from a plant closing) that results in an employment loss at the single site of
employment during any 30-day period, for (29 USC §2101(a)(3)):
• At least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time employees)
and at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time employees); or
• At least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees).
California WARN defines a mass layoff as a layoff during any 30-day period of
50 or more employees at a covered establishment. Unlike the federal WARN,
there is no 33-percent layoff percentage threshold. Lab C §1400(d).
Note that plant relocations resulting in reductions in force may qualify as “mass
layoffs” under the federal WARN statute.
Department of Labor regulations also provide definitions for and examples of
“facility or operating unit” (see 20 CFR §639.3(j)) and “single site of employment”
(see 20 CFR §639.3(i)). See also Teamsters Local Union 413 v Drivers, Inc.
(6th Cir 1996) 101 F3d 1107, 1110 (quasi-independent individual base
terminals in different states distant from main office are each individual
“single sites,” despite mobility of employee truck drivers); Carpenters Dist.
Council v Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. (5th Cir 1994) 15 F3d 1275 (corporate
18
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division and satellite facility constituted “single site”); Williams v Phillips Petroleum
Co. (5th Cir 1994) 23 F3d 930 (plants in different states could not be “single
site of employment”).
§18.28 b. Strikes and Other Exemptions
Under most circumstances, a strike or bona fide lockout or permanent
replacement of economic strikers does not qualify as a plant closure or mass
layoff under the federal WARN. See 29 USC §2103(2); 20 CFR §639.5(d).
California WARN differs in this respect, and does not have an exception for
strikes, bona fide lockouts, or permanent replacements of economic strikers.
Neither does the federal WARN apply to plant closings or mass layoffs that
result from the closing of a temporary facility or the completion of a finite
project if the employer can prove that the employees were hired with the
understanding that their employment was so limited. 29 USC §2103(1);
20 CFR §639.5(c)(2).This exemption may not apply when employees have
a reasonable expectation of returning to work at the next available assignment.
See, e.g., Marques v Telles Ranch, Inc. (ND Cal 1994) 867 F Supp 1438, 1444,
aff’d without opinion (9th Cir 1997) 133 F3d 927 (employer treated harvesters
as “permanent seasonal” employees who could expect to return to work at the
beginning of each new season).The reasonableness of the employee’s expectation
may be gauged from the terms of employment contracts and collective bargaining
agreements and from industry and local practice. See 20 CFR §639.5(c)(2).
See §18.20 about California WARN.
§18.29 2. Definition of “Employment Loss” and “Layoff”
The occurrence of a plant closing or mass layoff depends on an “employment
loss” as that term is used in the federal WARN, which defines it as applicable
only to (29 USC §2101(a)(6)):
• Any employment termination that is not a discharge for cause, voluntary
departure, or retirement;
• A layoff of more than 6 months; or
• A reduction in individual employees’ work hours of more than 50 percent
during each month of any 6-month period.
California WARN requires a “layoff,” which is defined as a separation from a
position for lack of funds or lack of work. Lab C §1400(c).
When an employer undertakes more than one of the above employment actions,
an employee may suffer multiple employment losses. Accordingly, each action
may require a separate notice. Graphic Communications Int’l Union, Local 31-N v
Quebecor Printing (USA) Corp. (4th Cir 2001) 252 F3d 296.
Employment losses by two or more groups within 90 days at a single site of
employment will be aggregated to meet the definition unless the employer can
show that the losses resulted from distinct causes and were not an attempt to
evade the statute’s requirements. 29 USC §2102(d). See §§18.30–18.41 on
notice requirements.
Employment loss does not include:
• A technical loss due to the sale of a business, when the employees lose their
employment with the former employer and become employees of the buyer
(29 USC §2101(b)(1); International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees &
Moving Picture Mach. Operators v Compact Video Servs., Inc. (9th Cir 1995) 50
F3d 1464, 1467; see also MacIsaac v Waste Mgmt. Collection & Recycling, Inc.
(2005) 134 CA4th 1076, 36 CR3d 650 (when offered the same position));
• A reduction in pay or benefits or the modification of employee handbooks
(50 F3d at 1469);
• A reassignment or transfer to employer-sponsored programs such as
retraining or job search activities (20 CFR §639.3(f)(2));
• Discharge for cause (29 USC §2101(a)(6)(A); see Hollowell v Orleans Regional
Hosp., LLC (5th Cir 2000) 217 F3d 379); or
• The relocation or consolidation of part or all of the employer’s business
when, before the closing or layoff, the employer offered to transfer the
employee with no more than a 6-month break in employment to (29 USC
§2101(b)(2); 20 CFR §639.3(f)(3)):
• A worksite at a reasonable commuting distance; or
• Any other worksite, and the employee accepts within 30 days of the offer of
the closing or layoff, whichever is later.
California WARN does not contain the preceding exemptions; see §18.25
concerning the sale of a business.
D. Notice
§18.30 1. Required Recipients
Under the federal WARN, the employer must provide notice of the plant
closing or mass layoff to:
• The chief elected officer of the exclusive representative or bargaining agent
for the affected employees;
NOTEØ If the chief elected officer on whom notice is served is not a local
union officer, it is advisable to serve notice on local union officials as well.
See 20 CFR §639.6(a).
If the employees are not represented, the employer must provide notice to (29
USC §2102(a); 20 CFR §639.6):
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• All employees who are reasonably expected to experience an employment
loss (including part-time employees);
• California’s dislocated worker unit at the Employment Development
Department (see Directory for address and telephone number); and
• The chief elected official of the unit of local government in which the
closing or layoff will occur.
Under California WARN, notice must be given to (Lab C §1401(a)):
• The affected employees;
• The Employment Development Department;
• The Local Workforce Investment Board; and
• The chief elected official of each city and county government within which
the termination, relocation, or mass layoff occurs.The EDD’s website provides
county-by-county information in this regard. See Directory.
§18.31 2. Contents
The notice of a plant closing or mass layoff must contain specific information
prescribed by the federal WARN’s implementing regulations. Depending on the
recipient, the notice must include some or all of the following (20 CFR §639.7):
• The name and address of the employment site;
• A statement of whether the plant closing or mass layoff is permanent or
temporary and, if the entire plant is to be closed, a statement to that effect;
• The expected date or a 14-day period in which the terminations or layoffs
are expected to occur;
• An indication of whether bumping rights exist (see §18.11);
• The names and job titles of employees who will be affected; and
• The name and telephone number of a company official to contact for
further information.
The employer must provide the best information available at the time notice is
given. Errors that occur as a result of later events and minor, inadvertent errors
will not invalidate the notice or create liability under the statute. 20 CFR
§639.7(a)(4); see Marques v Telles Ranch, Inc. (ND Cal 1994) 867 F Supp
1438, 1445, aff’d without opinion (9th Cir 1997) 133 F3d 927 (notice adequate
even though employer failed to include bumping rights or name and address of
company official to contact).
If the notice period has been shortened because of one of the exceptions
discussed in §§18.33–18.36, the employer’s notice must also include a brief
statement of the reason for the reduced notice period. 20 CFR §639.9. A mere
conclusory statement that the employer falls within one of the statutory exceptions
is inadequate; the employer must set forth sufficient underlying facts that led
to the shortened period to allow the employees to understand the situation.
See Alarcon v Keller Indus., Inc. (9th Cir 1994) 27 F3d 386, 389 (1-day notice
adequately explained basis for faltering company exception). See §18.34 on the
faltering company exception.
California WARN expressly incorporates these federal WARN notice
requirements by reference. Lab C §1401(b).
3. Timing of Notice
§18.32 a. General Rule
Generally, the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(WARN) requires that notice be given at least 60 calendar days in advance of
the first individual termination that is part of the plant closing or mass layoff.
29 USC §2102(a).
To calculate whether the threshold number of employment losses has occurred
for notice purposes, an employer should:
(1) Identify all employment losses that occurred or are planned in the 30 days
behind and the 30 days ahead and calculate whether within any 30-day period,
the aggregate number will satisfy the statutory minimum of 29 USC
§§2101(a)(2)–(3); and
(2) Identify all employment losses that occurred or are planned in the 90 days
behind and the 90 days ahead and calculate whether within any 90-day period,
employment losses for two or more groups at a single site of employment in
the aggregate number will satisfy the minimum of 29 USC §2102(d).
If the employer can prove that the employment losses result from separate and
distinct causes and are not an attempt to evade the statute’s requirements, no
notice will be required. 20 CFR §639.5(a).
NOTEØAn employer does not violate the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) (29 USC §§141–187) by giving notice in good faith to comply with
the WARN. 29 USC §2108.Thus, an employer may give WARN notice
before it has given the union notice or engaged in bargaining about a layoff
or plant closure, and WARN notice may in fact constitute notice under the
NLRA for purposes of the union requesting bargaining.
Similarly, under California WARN, the notice must be given 60 days before
the mass layoff, relocation, or termination. Lab C §1401(a). For purposes of
computing the threshold number of employment losses for “mass layoffs,” the
operative period is 30 days forward or backward. Unlike the federal WARN,
there is no express statutory or regulatory language that employment losses
within 90 days are to be aggregated as part of the 50-employee threshold
absent an employer’s proof that the employment losses result from separate and
distinct causes. Nevertheless, this is an area of potential ambiguity, and cautious
employers may wish to include in their calculations layoffs both 90 days forward
and backward. (Also, this is required under the federal WARN.)
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§18.33 b. Exceptions
Congress recognized that a full 60 days’ notice of a plant closing or mass layoff
will not always be possible. Consequently, the statute provides that reduced
notice is permissible in certain circumstances, so long as:
(1)The employer includes in the notice a brief statement of the reason for
reducing the notification period; and
(2)The employer gives notice as soon as is practicable. 29 USC §2102(b).
However, an unwarranted delay in providing notice may create liability under
the statute even when one of the exceptions discussed in §§18.34–18.36 applies.
See, e.g., Wholesale & Retail Food Distrib. Local 63 v Santa Fe Terminal Servs., Inc.
(CD Cal 1993) 826 F Supp 326, 333 (7-day delay in sending out notice after
occurrence of unforeseen business circumstance was not “notice as soon
as practicable”).
§18.34 (1) Faltering Company Exception
Under the federal WARN, an employer may provide less than 60 days’ notice of
a plant closing if it was taking specific action to procure financing or business
that would have enabled it to avoid or postpone the shutdown and the employer
reasonably believed in good faith that giving notice would have precluded the
employer from obtaining the necessary capital or business. 29 USC §2102(b)(1);
20 CFR §639.9(a). See, e.g., Alarcon v Keller Indus., Inc. (9th Cir 1994) 27 F3d
386. In considering whether notice would have prevented the financing or
business deal, the court may consider the finances of the company as a whole
rather than of a particular facility or site. 20 CFR §639.9(a)(4).
Under California WARN, an employer is not required to comply with the
notice for relocation or termination, if, at the time the notice would have been
required (Lab C §1402.5(a)):
• The employer was actively seeking capital or business;
• The capital or business would have enabled the employer to avoid or postpone
the relocation or termination; and
• The employer reasonably and in good faith believed that giving the notice
would have precluded the employer from obtaining the needed capital or
business.
The exception does not apply to a mass layoff.
§18.35 (2) Unforeseen Business Circumstance Exception
Under the federal WARN, reduced-time notice of a plant closing or mass layoff
is permissible if the cause is a business circumstance not reasonably foreseeable
at the time notice otherwise would have been required. 29 USC §2102(b)(2);
20 CFR §639.9(b). Such circumstances may include the termination of a major
contract by a principal client, a strike at a major supplier, a dramatic economic
downturn, a government ordered layoff, or a government order closing an
employment site. See, e.g., Watson v Michigan Indus. Holdings, Inc. (6th Cir 2002)
311 F3d 760, 765 (loss of major customer constituted unforeseen business
circumstance);Wholesale & Retail Food Distrib. Local 63 v Santa Fe Terminal Servs.,
Inc. (CD Cal 1993) 826 F Supp 326, 332 (same); International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs,Warehousemen & Helpers v American Delivery Serv. Co. (9th Cir 1995) 50
F3d 770 (reversing summary judgment when supplier who terminated major
contract was determined to be corporate parent of employer); Buck v FDIC
(8th Cir 1996) 75 F3d 1285 (WARN Act does not apply in context of
government-ordered closures over which employer has no control; bank employee
layoffs as part of bank takeover were effectively ordered by government, not
employer); Deveraturda v Globe Aviation Security Servs. (9th Cir 2006) 454 F3d
1043, 1046 (WARN does not apply when mass layoff is ordered by government
(federal government ordered replacement of privately employed airport security
personnel as part of federalization program, and employer had no control).
In Deveraturda, the court distinguished Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees
Int’l Union Local 54 v Elsinore Shore Assocs. (3d Cir 1999) 173 F3d 175, 180, in
which a state commission closed a gambling casino that failed to meet the
commission’s licensing conditions. In Deveraturda, the employer had nothing to
do with the conditions that caused the layoffs, and could do nothing to remedy
them. Deveraturda, 173 F3d at 1049 (critical inquiry is not what entity
employed affected employees at time of layoff; rather, it is who ordered layoff
to occur).The Deveraturda court also distinguished precedent in which courts
applied WARN when the government canceled a contract that causes a mass
layoff (see Halkias v General Dynamics Corp. (5th Cir 1998) 137 F3d 333, 335;
Loehrer v McDonnell Douglas Corp. (8th Cir 1996) 98 F3d 1056, 1060) because
they involved the “unforeseeable business circumstances” defense, not the issue
of whether WARN actually applies, and because they did not involve an
absolute government takeover of the employer’s business resulting in
government-ordered replacement of private employees with government
employees. Deveraturda, 173 F3d at 1049.
An employer is not foreclosed from claiming the “unforeseen business
circumstance” exception because of its failure to negotiate a notice or penalty
provision in its customer contract. See 50 F3d at 777; Wholesale & Retail Food
Distrib. Local 63 v Santa Fe Terminal Servs., Inc. (CD Cal 1993) 826 F Supp 326,
333; but see Local 217,Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union v MHM, Inc. (2d Cir 1992)
976 F2d 805.
California WARN does not include an “unforeseen business circumstance”
exception.
§18.36 (3) Natural Disaster Exception
Natural disasters, such as floods, earthquakes, or droughts, that directly cause a
plant closing or mass layoff may excuse the employer from complying with the
60-days’ notice requirement. 29 USC §2102(b)(2); 20 CFR §639.9(c).
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Under California WARN, notice is not required if a mass layoff, relocation, or
plant closure is necessitated by a physical calamity or act of war. Lab C §1401(c).
§18.37 4. Manner of Service
Notice may be served by any reasonable means of delivery, including first-class
mail, personal delivery with optional signed receipt, or insertion into employee
pay envelopes. 20 CFR §639.8.
§18.38 5. Forms
The forms in §§18.39–18.41 exemplify notices that satisfy, minimally, the
federal and California statutes’ notice requirements. An employer should tailor
the notice to the circumstances. For example, it might be appropriate for an
employer to incorporate the required information contained in the form in
§18.39 into a more extensive letter dealing with severance, outplacement, and
other benefits to be provided to affected employees.
§18.39 a. Form: Notice to Employees or Representative re: Mass
Layoff
18.39–1 Notice to employees or representative re: mass layoff
NOTICE OF REDUCTION IN FORCE
Dear _ _[name of employee/union representative]_ _:
As a result of _ _[describe triggering event]_ _, _ _[name of employer]_ _ will be
eliminating various jobs and terminating the employment of many employees at _ _[name
and address of worksite]_ _. _ _[You are one of the employees/All employees in, e.g.,
bargaining unit no. 123 are]_ _ affected by this reduction in force. Employee layoffs will
commence on approximately _ _[date]_ _, and we anticipate that _ _[you/all affected
employees]_ _ will be separated from the Company on or about _ _[date]_ _, or within 14
days thereafter.
The Company expects this workforce reduction to be permanent, and no bumping rights
exist.
For further information, please contact _ _[name, address, and phone number of contact
person]_ _.
Sincerely,
__[Signature]__
_ _[Title, e.g., Human Resources Manager]_ _
§18.40 b. Form: Notice to Chief Elected Government Official,
State Dislocated Worker Unit, or Workforce
Investment Board re: Mass Layoff
18.40–1 Notice to chief elected government official, state dislocated
worker unit, or workforce investment board re: mass layoff
MASS LAYOFF NOTICE
Dear _ _[e.g., city mayor, chair of county board of supervisors]_ _:
This letter is to advise the _ _[City of _ _[specify]_ _/County of _ _[specify]_ _/State of
California]_ _ that _ _[name of employer]_ _ plans to terminate the employment of a
number of employees, which may entail a “mass layoff” under the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (WARN) or applicable state law. These terminations will occur at
_ _[facility]_ _ located at _ _[address]_ _. It is anticipated that these will be permanent
terminations and that employee separations will commence on or about _ _[date]_ _,
and will continue over the following _ _[specify period of time, e.g., 3 months]_ _.
These terminations will affect a total of approximately _ _[specify number]_ _ employees
in various positions in this facility, as follows:
There are no bumping rights in existence, nor are there any unions representing the
affected employees.
For further information, please contact _ _[name, address, and telephone number of
contact person]_ _.
Sincerely,
__[Signature]__
_ _[Title, e.g., Human Resources Manager]_ _
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Office and Clerical _ _[number]_ _
Professional and Managerial _ _[number]_ _
_ _[Specify others]_ _ _ _[number]_ _
Total: _ _[number]_ _
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§18.41 c. Form: Notice to Chief Elected Government Official or
Dislocated Worker Unit re: Plant Closing/Termination
or Relocation
18.41–1 Notice to chief elected government official or dislocated worker
unit re: plant closing/termination or relocation
FACILITY CLOSING NOTICE
Dear _ _[e.g., city mayor, chair of county board of supervisors]_ _:
In accordance with the provisions of and regulations under the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (WARN) or applicable state law, this letter is to advise the _
_[City of _ _[specify]_ _/County of _ _[specify]_ _/State of California]_ _ that _ _[name of
employer]_ _ will close _ _[and relocate]_ _ its _ _[facility]_ _ located at _ _[address]_ _,
on or about _ _[date]_ _. This will be a permanent closing _ _[and relocation]_ _ of the _
_[facility]_ _, and it is anticipated that the employee separations will commence and
conclude on or about _ _[date]_ _. The closing will affect a total of _ _[specify number]_ _
employees in all positions in this Division, as follows:
There are no applicable bumping rights in existence, nor are there any unions representing
the affected employees.
For further information, please contact _ _[name, address, and telephone number of
contact person]_ _.
Sincerely,
__[Signature]__
_ _[Title, e.g., Human Resources Manager]_ _
Job Titles Number of Employees
Executives _ _[number]_ _
Clerical and Accounting _ _[number]_ _
Engineers _ _[number]_ _
Technicians _ _[number]_ _
Manufacturing _ _[number]_ _
Direct Labor _ _[number]_ _
Managers & Supervisors _ _[number]_ _
Quality Assurance _ _[number]_ _
Inspectors _ _[number]_ _
Total: _ _[number]_ _
§18.42 E. Liability for Violation of WARN Notice
Requirements
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) (29 USC
§§2101–2109) provides stiff penalties for noncompliance. See 29 USC §2104.
An employer may be forced to pay wages and benefits to each aggrieved
employee for each day of violation, up to a maximum of 60 work days. 29 USC
§2104(a)(1)–(2); Burns v Stone Forest Indus., Inc. (9th Cir 1998) 147 F3d 1182;
but see United Mine Workers v Eighty-Four Mining Co. (3d Cir 2005) 159 Fed Appx
345 (holding minority view that damages are calculated based on number of
calendar days in violation period). If the employer does not provide notice to
the local unit of government, it is also subject to a civil penalty of up to $500
per day, unless the employer pays each affected employee the amount for which
it is liable within 3 weeks of the date the employer orders the plant closing or
layoff. 29 USC §2104(a)(3). In its discretion, the court may allow the
prevailing party to recover its reasonable attorney fees. 29 USC §2104(a)(6).
The court may not, however, enjoin a plant closing or mass layoff as part of the
remedy. 29 USC §2104(b).
NOTEØ Good Faith Exception: If the employer can prove it had reasonable
grounds for believing its noncompliance was not a violation of federal or
California WARN, a court may, in its discretion, reduce the employer’s
liability. 29 USC §2104(a)(4); Lab C §1405; see Graphic Communications Int’l
Union, Local 31-N v Quebecor Printing (USA) Corp. (4th Cir 2001) 252 F3d
296, 301 (and see opinion on remand: Graphic Communications Int’l Union,
Local 31-N v Quebecor Printing (USA) Corp. (D Md 2002) 221 F Supp 2d 609);
Wholesale & Retail Food Distrib. Local 63 v Santa Fe Terminal Servs., Inc. (CD Cal
1993) 826 F Supp 326, 335.
NOTEØ Penalty payments required by WARN may not be used to offset
penalty payments assessed for violations of the National Labor Relations Act
(29 USC §§141–187). Times Herald Printing Co. (1994) 315 NLRB 700.
In United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v Brown Group, Inc. (1996)
517 US 544, 134 L Ed 2d 758, 116 S Ct 1529, a unanimous United States
Supreme Court ruled that unions have standing to sue on behalf of their
members to recover damages for employer violations of WARN.
An employer who fails to give notice under California WARN is liable for back
pay at the average regular rate of compensation received by the employee
during the last 3 years of his or her employment, or the employee’s final rate
of compensation, whichever is higher, and the value of the costs of any benefits
to which the employee would have been entitled, including the costs of any
medical expenses incurred by the employee that would have been covered
under the employee benefit plan.The employer is liable for a period of up to
60 days or one-half the number of days the employee was employed, whichever
period is smaller. Lab C §1402. As under federal law, the employer may be
subject to a civil penalty of no more than $500 per day, unless the employer
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pays all applicable employees the amounts due under Lab C §1402 within 3
weeks from the date the employer orders the mass layoff, relocation, or termination.
Lab C §1403.The court may award reasonable attorney fees. Lab C §1404.
F. Defenses
§18.43 1. Statute of Limitations
In North Star Steel Co. v Thomas (1995) 515 US 29, 132 L Ed 2d 27, 115 S Ct 1927,
the United States Supreme Court held that the limitations period for civil
enforcement actions brought under WARN is provided by state law and not
analogous federal laws.
Inasmuch as California WARN does not have an express limitations period, it
would arguably be covered by the 3-year limitation period for actions on liabilities
created by statute (CCP §338(a)). See Wholesale & Retail Food Distrib. Local 63 v Santa
Fe Terminal Servs., Inc. (CD Cal 1993) 826 F Supp 326, 329 (applying 3-year statute
of limitations to federal WARN).
§18.44 2. Waiver
Employees who knowingly and voluntarily sign releases of their federal claims
on termination may also be held to have waived their WARN claims, even if the
release does not expressly mention the statute. See Williams v Phillips Petroleum Co.
(5th Cir 1994) 23 F3d 930, 935. See §§18.3–18.10 on releases and waivers.
IV. Continuing Health Insurance
Benefits
§18.45 A. COBRA
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA)
(29 USC §§1161–1169) requires employers employing 20 or more employees
to offer an election of continuing health care coverage to qualified beneficiaries
when there is a “qualifying event.” 29 USC §§1161–1162. For purposes of
COBRA, qualifying events include the voluntary or involuntary termination
of a covered employee’s employment (29 USC §1163), which clearly brings
employers subject to WARN within the scope of COBRA’s requirement to
offer the election.
California AB 1401 was enacted on September 22, 2002, providing that certain
individuals who begin receiving COBRA coverage on or after January 1, 2003,
may be eligible for additional COBRA coverage.
Specifically, this coverage provides up to 36 months of COBRA coverage after
the exhaustion of the 18-month (or 29-month, in the event of Disability
Determination) coverage period provided under federal law. In cases of
employers not subject to federal COBRA, the legislation provides a 36-month
coverage period for qualified beneficiaries, including the employee.
§18.46 B. Labor Code §2807
In California, Lab C §2807 requires that “all employers” distribute a
standardized written description of the Health Insurance Premium Program
established by the State Department of Health Services (along with any
COBRA notice) to terminated employees.
V. Discrimination Claims
§18.47 A. Protected Categories
It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of any of the
following factors:
• Age (29 USC §§621–634 (Age Discrimination in Employment Act)); Govt
C §12940(a) (FEHA));
• Sex, race, color, religion, or national origin (42 USC §2000e–2(a) (Title
VII); Govt C §12940(a) (FEHA));
• Pregnancy (42 USC §2000e(k); Govt C §§12926(p), 12940(a));
• Gender and gender identity (Govt C §§12926(p), 12940(a); Pen C
§422.56);
• Marital status (Govt C §12940(a); 29 CFR §1604.4);
• Sexual orientation (Govt C §12940(a));
• Ancestry (Govt C §12940(a));
• Military Service (Mil & V C § 394; 38 USC §§4301-4333);
• A pension about to vest (29 USC §1140 (ERISA §510));
• Disability (42 USC §12112 (ADA); Govt C §12940(a) (FEHA));
• Medical condition (Govt C §§12926(h), 12940(a));
• Injury in the course of employment or filing a claim for workers’
compensation (Lab C §132a);
• The employee’s exercise of a protected right, such as filing a discrimination
claim or unfair labor practice charge, or reporting a suspected violation of
the law (see, e.g., Govt C §12940(h));
• Concerted activity (29 USC §151; Lab C §923);
• Whistleblowing (Lab C §§1102.5, 1103);
• Disclosing amount of wages (Lab C §232); or
• Disclosing working conditions (Lab C §232.5).
Alleged age discrimination is often an issue following a reduction in force. An
employer may not discriminate on the basis of age against any employee. See
Govt C §12940(a); 29 USC §§621–634 (ADEA) (prohibiting age discrimination
against employees between the ages of 40 and 69); O’Connor v Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp. (1996) 517 US 308, 134 L Ed 2d 433, 116 S Ct 1307 (in wrongful
termination case, plaintiff need not show that he was replaced by someone
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outside protected class in order to establish prima facie case of age discrimination).
To determine whether the RIF presents a risk of claims of discrimination,
employers should review the proposed layoff list in 5-year age brackets (i.e.,
40–45, 45–50, 50–55) as well as by gender and minority status. Employers
should be aware that the use of salary as a criterion for layoff is prohibited if it
has a discriminatory effect on employees in the age-protected group. See Govt
C §12941.
NOTEØThe Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (OWBPA) (Pub L
101–433, 104 Stat 978) prohibits age discrimination in providing employee
benefits and ensures that waiver of ADEA claims is knowing and voluntary.
See 29 USC §§623, 626, 630. See also §15.23.
B. Showing Necessary to Support
Discrimination Action
1. Disparate Treatment
§18.48 a. Prima Facie Case
Claims of discrimination may be based on the employer’s disparate treatment of
categories of employees (see §§15.55–15.61). A prima facie case can be made
for age discrimination (the most common claim following a reduction in force)
by the plaintiff’s showing that he or she:
• Was 40 years old or older;
• Was performing his or her job in a satisfactory manner;
• Was discharged; and
• Was replaced by a substantially younger employee with equal or inferior
qualifications. But see Begnal v Canfield & Assocs. (2000) 78 CA4th 66, 92
CR2d 611, which held that a plaintiff who is replaced by an older person
can nevertheless prove age discrimination through other direct or circumstantial
evidence of such discrimination. See also Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. Partnership
(9th Cir. 2008) 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7261, stating that the 9th Circuit will
treat this element with “flexibility.”
See Wallis v J.R. Simplot Co. (9th Cir 1994) 26 F3d 885, 891; Washington v Garrett
(9th Cir 1993) 10 F3d 1421; Rose v Wells Fargo & Co. (9th Cir 1990) 902 F2d
1417, 1421. See also O’Connor v Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. (1996) 517 US
308, 134 L Ed 2d 433, 116 S Ct 1307.
NOTEØA disparate treatment and disparate impact analysis should be
considered before the employer undertakes a RIF.
The length of time between the plaintiff’s termination and alleged replacement
also bears on the strength of the prima facie case. See Rose v Wells Fargo & Co.
(9th Cir 1990) 902 F2d 1417, 1422; Raschick v Prudent Supply, Inc. (8th Cir 1987)
830 F2d 1497, 1498.
Even if the plaintiff was not replaced as a result of the RIF, he or she still may
establish a prima facie case through circumstantial or statistical evidence showing
that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
age discrimination. Rose v Wells Fargo & Co. (9th Cir 1990) 902 F2d 1417, 1421.
Courts impose a heavy burden of proof, however, on plaintiffs relying on
circumstantial evidence to show such discrimination. See Leichihman v Pickwick
Int’l (8th Cir 1987) 814 F2d 1263, 1270:
[I]n a reduction-in-force case, there is no adverse inference to be drawn
from an employee’s discharge if his position and duties are completely
eliminated.… If [the discharged employee] cannot show that [his employer]
had some continuing need for his skills and services in that his various duties
were still being performed, then the basis of his claim collapses.
See also Ritter v Hughes Aircraft Co. (9th Cir 1995) 58 F3d 454, 457 (insufficient
circumstantial evidence to raise inference of age discrimination).When the
employee relies only on statistical evidence, the statistics “must show a stark
pattern of discrimination unexplainable on grounds other than age.” Rose v Wells
Fargo & Co. (9th Cir 1990) 902 F2d 1417, 1423, quoting Palmer v U.S. (9th Cir
1986) 794 F2d 534, 539. See also Nesbit v Pepsico, Inc. (9th Cir 1993) 994 F2d
703, 705 (insufficient statistical showing).
NOTEØThis greater burden of proof for ADEA plaintiffs in RIF cases may not
apply to claims under California’s Fair EmployPAGE 1718.1ment and Housing
Act. See Clark v Claremont Univ. Ctr. (1992) 6 CA4th 639, 670, 8 CR2d 151.
§18.49 b. Rebuttal
The shifting burden of persuasion applied to a Title VII discrimination claim
also applies to claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
See O’Connor v Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. (1996) 517 US 308, 134 L Ed 2d
433, 116 S Ct 1307 (assuming, but not deciding, that the McDonnell Douglas
evidentiary framework applies to ADEA cases); Pottenger v Potlatch Corp. (9th Cir
2003) 329 F3d 740, 745; Palmer v U.S. (9th Cir 1986) 794 F2d 534, 537. Once
the employee has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden
of production shifts to the employer to produce some evidence that it had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Watson v Fort
Worth Bank & Trust (1988) 487 US 977, 101 L Ed 2d 827, 108 S Ct 2777. It may
assert, for example, that the decision resulted from legitimate economic
considerations underlying the reduction in force. See, e.g., Ritter v Hughes
Aircraft Co. (9th Cir 1995) 58 F3d 454, 458; Martin v Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
(1994) 29 CA4th 1718, 1731, 35 CR2d 181.When the plaintiff’s claim arises
from a reduction in force, the employer may rebut by showing that it used
neutral selection criteria for determining who would be terminated. See 29
CA4th at 1731; Coburn v Pan Am.World Airways, Inc. (DC Cir 1983) 711 F2d 339,
342 (see §18.12).The employer may also rebut the plaintiff’s statistical data
with its own. See, e.g., Rose v Wells Fargo & Co. (9th Cir 1990) 902 F2d 1417,
1423 n5 (employer showed that average age and mix of workforce before and
after employment action were approximately the same).
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§18.50 c. Pretext
If the employer successfully rebuts the plaintiff’s prima facie case (see
§§18.48–18.49), the plaintiff has the burden of showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that the employer’s asserted reason for its action is pretextual.
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v Hicks (1993) 509 US 502, 125 L Ed 2d 407, 113 S Ct 2742.
Unsubstantiated suspicions of discrimination will not prove pretext and will
not create a genuine issue of material fact to withstand summary judgment. See
Soules v Cadam, Inc. (1991) 2 CA4th 390, 398, 3 CR2d 6 (FEHA); Elliott v Group
Med. & Surgical Serv. (5th Cir 1983) 714 F2d 556, 567 (ADEA). A plaintiff’s
ability to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, however, combined
with sufficient evidence that the employer’s proffered reason for the employment
action is false, may permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
discrimination. Reeves v Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. (2000) 530 US 133,
147 L Ed 2d 105, 120 S Ct 2097 (reversing Fifth Circuit’s ruling that evidence
was insufficient to sustain jury’s finding that employer had discriminated against
employee on basis of age).
In an age discrimination case, the plaintiff’s ultimate burden may be especially
heavy in the context of a corporate reorganization. See Simpson v Midland-Ross
Corp. (6th Cir 1987) 823 F2d 937.
2. Disparate Impact
§18.51 a. Prima Facie Case
A disparate impact claim challenges employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Atonio
v Wards Cove Packing Co. (9th Cir 1987) 810 F2d 1477, 1480. See Govt C §12941.
To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, an employee must:
• Identify the specific employment practice challenged;
• Show that it has a disparate impact on a protected category; and
• Prove causation, i.e., the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind
and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the
exclusion of individuals because of their membership in a protected group.
See Rose v Wells Fargo & Co. (9th Cir 1990) 902 F2d 1417, 1424 (citing Watson v
Fort Worth Bank & Trust (1988) 487 US 977, 994, 101 L Ed 2d 827, 108 S Ct
2777); Ibarbia v Regents of Univ. of Cal. (1987) 191 CA3d 1318, 237 CR 92.
See generally, §§15.62–15.64.
The labor pool from which statistical evidence is drawn must be sufficiently
large to identify a meaningful pattern. See Shutt v Sandoz Crop Protection Corp.
(9th Cir 1991) 944 F2d 1431 (when employee was terminated in RIF as part of
merger, statistically relevant pool was composed of similarly situated employees
in merged corporation).
§18.52 b. Rebuttal
The employer may rebut the plaintiff’s claim of disparate impact by discrediting
plaintiff’s statistics or proffering statistics of its own to show that no disparity
exists.The employer may also produce evidence that its disparate employment
practices are based on legitimate business reasons, such as job-relatedness or
business necessity. Rose v Wells Fargo & Co. (9th Cir 1990) 902 F2d 1417, 1424.
See §§15.43–15.44, 15.68 on the job-relatedness and business necessity defenses.
§18.53 c. Nondiscriminatory Alternatives
If the employer can rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case with, e.g., evidence of
job-relatedness or business necessity, the plaintiff must produce evidence that
other selection practices that do not have a discriminatory effect would also
serve the employer’s interests. Shutt v Sandoz Crop Protection Corp. (9th Cir
1991) 944 F2d 1431.
§18.54 d. Adverse Impact Analysis for Age Discrimination
The availability of a claim of discrimination under the ADEA based on disparate
impact was in doubt in many circuits following the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hazen Paper Co. v Biggins (1993) 507 US 604, 123 L Ed 2d 338, 347, 351,
113 S Ct 1701.The Court, however, has clarified its position on the issue. In
Smith v City of Jackson (2005) 544 US 228, 161 L Ed 2d 410, 125 S Ct 1536, the
court recognized that employers may be sued under the ADEA for actions that
have a disparate impact on older workers. It held that the scope of disparate
impact liability under the ADEA is narrower than under Title VII, and an
employee bringing an ADEA claim under the disparate impact theory must
identify a specific test, requirement, or practice that has an adverse impact
on a protected group. In California, a disparate impact claim is also available
under FEHA (Govt C §§12900–12996), which specifies that age discrimination
is found if the use of salary as a basis for termination adversely impacts older
employees. Govt C §12941.
§18.55 C. Defenses
An employer faced with a discrimination suit following a reduction in force
may draw on an array of defenses, including that:
• The termination decision was based on reasonable factors other than plaintiff’s
protected status;
• The plaintiff was terminated for good cause;
• The employer was observing the terms of a bona fide seniority system, bona
fide employee benefit plan, or bona fide merit system;
• The protected characteristic (e.g., age) was a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business. See, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v Criswell (1985) 472 US
400, 86 L Ed 2d 321, 105 S Ct 2743 (age 60 retirement requirement for
flight engineers was reasonably necessary to safe operation of airline).
34
Baker & McKenzie
35
Reductions in Force and Plant Closings
§18.56 VI. Breach of Contract and
Related Claims
California law provides employees with an array of common-law and statutory
claims that may be asserted following an employment termination. Claims
of breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, constructive or wrongful discharge, violation of the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA) (Govt C §§12900–12996), and violation of public
policy are discussed in chap 17.
Employers should be aware that a legitimate reduction in force provides its
own defense to claims of breach of implied contract and breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. As a policy matter, courts avoid second-guessing
the business decisions of employers, and hold that the defense of good cause
for termination exists as a matter of law when the RIF is based on lack of work
or other legitimate business considerations. See Malmstrom v Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp. (1986) 187 CA3d 299, 231 CR 820; Gianaculas v Trans World
Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir 1985) 761 F2d 1391, 1395; Cox v Resilient Flooring Div.
of Congoleum Corp. (CD Cal 1986) 638 F Supp 726.
§18.57 VII. NLRA Compliance
Special issues arise when the workforce involved in a plant closing, plant
relocation, or RIF is unionized. Before undertaking any employment action, an
employer should carefully consider whether it has a statutory duty to bargain
with the union over its decision or the effects of its decision and whether it
must satisfy any other obligations under its collective bargaining agreement.
§18.58 A. Subjects of Decision Bargaining
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 USC §§141–187) imposes on
employers a duty to bargain with its employees’ representative in good faith
over “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” (NLRA
§8(d); 29 USC §158(d)), and makes an employer’s unilateral change in any of
these categories an unfair labor practice (NLRA §8(a)(5); 29 USC §158(a)(5)).
There are limits to the meaning of “terms and conditions of employment,”
however, and the National Labor Relations Board and the Supreme Court have
provided guidance as to when fundamental business decisions fall outside the
scope of mandatory bargaining and within the exclusive prerogative of the
employer. Even when no bargaining is required as to the decision itself, however,
it may be required as to the effects of the decision. See §§18.63, 18.66.
§18.59 1. Total Plant Closings
In Textile Workers Union v Darlington Mfg. Co. (1965) 380 US 263, 272, 13 L Ed
2d 827, 85 S Ct 994, the Supreme Court ruled that an employer need not
bargain with the union over any aspect of the employer’s decision to shut down
a business entirely. Under the Darlington rule, such a plant-closing decision will
not constitute an unfair labor practice even if the plant closing is motivated
by antiunion animus or a desire to retaliate against employees for the filing
of unfair labor practice charges. Contris Packing Co. (1983) 268 NLRB 193.
Although the employer is not obliged to bargain over the decision itself, it must
bargain over the effects of that decision. See §§18.63, 18.66.
NOTEØ If a collective bargaining agreement is already in place, a temporary
plant shutdown will not relieve the employer of its duty to recognize and
bargain with the union when the plant reopens, unless there has been
a substantial change in the operations or character of the bargaining unit.
See El Torito-La Fiesta Restaurants, Inc. v NLRB (9th Cir 1991) 929 F2d 490.
§18.60 2. Partial Plant Closings
The decision to partially shut down a business is not a mandatory bargaining
subject, and so long as the decision is in fact economically motivated, it will not
give rise to an unfair labor practice. First Nat’l Maintenance Corp. v NLRB (1981)
452 US 666, 69 L Ed 2d 318, 101 S Ct 2573. If the union can prove through
direct or circumstantial evidence, however, that the partial closing was motivated
by antiunion animus or intended as a retaliation against employees for filing
unfair labor practice charges, the partial closing will constitute an unfair labor
practice under NLRA §8(a)(3) or (4). 29 USC §158(a)(3)–(4). See Textile Workers
Union v Darlington Mfg. Co. (1965) 380 US 263, 275, 13 L Ed 2d 827, 85 S Ct
994. Note that a decision to close down part of a plant and relocate workers to
another plant may require decision bargaining. See §18.65.
Even though there is no duty to bargain over the decision to partially close a
business, NLRA §8(a)(5) (29 USC §158(a)(5)) has been interpreted to require
the employer to bargain over the effects of that decision, with the accompanying
duty to disclose relevant information. First Nat’l Maintenance Corp. v NLRB (1981)
452 US 666, 681, 69 L Ed 2d 318, 101 S Ct 2573. See §§18.66–18.67.
§18.61 3. Plant Relocations
The National Labor Relations Board has fashioned a test for determining
whether a particular employer’s decision to relocate bargaining unit work is a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Generally, an employer must bargain when the
relocation is unaccompanied by a basic change in the nature of the employer’s
operation or when the union could and would offer concessions that meet or
exceed the benefits of the relocation. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l
Union v NLRB (DC Cir 1993) 1 F3d 24, 29.
The burden is on the NLRB General Counsel to establish a prima facie case by
showing that the decision to relocate was unaccompanied by a basic change in
the nature of the employer’s operations; thus, the decision is a mandatory
subject of bargaining.The employer may rebut that claim by establishing that:
• The relocation involves a basic change in the nature of the employer’s operation;
• The relocation involves a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise;
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• The work at the new site varies significantly from the work at the old site; or
• The work performed at the old site is to be discontinued entirely and not
moved to the new site.
As an alternative defense, the employer may show by a preponderance of the
evidence that:
• Direct or indirect labor costs were not a factor in the decision; or
• Even if labor costs were a factor, the union could not have offered labor cost
concessions that could have changed the relocation decision.
NOTEØ Once an employer and union have entered a collective bargaining
agreement, there is a presumption that the union’s majority status continues
when the employer relocates if (1) the new plant is a short distance from
the old, (2) the work at the new plant is substantially the same as at the old,
and (3) the employees transferred from the old plant constitute a substantial
percentage (approximately 40 percent or more) of the new workforce. See
NLRB v Rock Bottom Stores, Inc. (2d Cir 1995) 51 F3d 366; Harte & Co. (1986)
278 NLRB 947; Westwood Import Co. v NLRB (9th Cir 1982) 681 F2d 664, 666.
When the employer moves only part of a bargaining unit to the new location,
there is a rebuttable presumption that the new facility is a separate unit, and
the employer need not recognize or bargain with the union unless a majority
of the employees in the new unit are transferees from the original bargaining
unit. Gitano Group, Inc. & U.S. Outerwear, single & joint employers, dba Gitano Distrib.
Ctr. & United Auto.,Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers,AFL-CIO (1992) 308 NLRB
1172, 1175.
§18.62 4. Subcontracting to Nonunion Employees
If a partial plant closing or reduction in force results from the employer’s
decision to subcontract work previously held by unionized employees to a
nonunion subcontractor, the employer must bargain over its decision, as well as
the effects of its decision. Textile Workers Union v Darlington Mfg. Co. (1965) 380
US 263, 272 n16, 13 L Ed 2d 827, 85 S Ct 994; Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v
NLRB (1964) 379 US 203, 13 L Ed 2d 233, 85 S Ct 398.
§18.63 B. Subjects of Effects Bargaining
The duty to bargain over effects applies to decisions to partially close a plant
and to relocate.This duty extends to any subject bearing on the employees’
terms and conditions of employment, such as:
• Severance pay;
• Payments into a pension fund;
• Preferential hiring at other plants;
• Employee transfers with seniority rights;
• Reference letters;
• Health insurance and pension benefits;
• Retraining funds;
• Job security;
• Union representation; and
• Termination of the collective bargaining agreement.
Fraser & Johnston Co. v NLRB (9th Cir 1972) 469 F2d 1259, 1262; Friedman’s
Express, Inc. (1994) 315 NLRB 971; Los Angeles Soap Co. (1990) 300 NLRB 289, 295.
§18.64 C. The Duty to Bargain
The duty to bargain arises once the union has requested bargaining. If the union
fails to request bargaining after it receives notice of the employer’s intention to
close a plant or relocate, it may waive its rights. See Penntech Papers, Inc. v NLRB
(1st Cir 1983) 706 F2d 18; National Car Rental Sys., Inc. (1980) 252 NLRB 159;
U.S. Lingerie Corp. (1968) 170 NLRB 750.
§18.65 1. Decision Bargaining
The parties must meet at reasonable times and negotiate in good faith (NLRA
§8(d); 29 USC §158(d)), but if the parties reach an impasse, the employer can
proceed to implement its decision. Taft Broadcasting Co. (1967) 163 NLRB 475.
The employer’s obligation is to give the union a reasonable opportunity to
bargain. It is advisable for the employer to give notice of the decision as soon as
it becomes a serious possibility. A few weeks’ notice of the decision will
generally be considered sufficient, while a few days’ notice will not, unless
there is some legitimate business reason for the delay. See §§18.30–18.41
about giving notice.
§18.66 2. Effects Bargaining
The duty to engage in effects bargaining is satisfied if the parties negotiate “in a
meaningful manner and at a meaningful time.” “Meaningful manner” means that
the union must have an opportunity to discuss the full range of subjects bearing
on the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. First Nat’l Maintenance
Corp. v NLRB (1981) 452 US 666, 682, 69 L Ed 2d 318, 101 S Ct 2573.
The duty will not be satisfied by bargaining over “technical aspects” of work
performed by employees who wind up the affairs of a facility or issues that are
only of concern to a small number of the bargaining unit employees. Friedman’s
Express, Inc. (1994) 315 NLRB 971. Nor will it be satisfied if there is evidence
of bad faith on the employer’s part. See NLRB v Triumph Curing Ctr. (9th Cir
1978) 571 F2d 462, 471 (employer’s negotiations were a “sham” when it moved
equipment, employees, and supervisors to subcontractor’s premises during
negotiations and hired subcontractor after closing plant).
“Meaningful time” has been construed to mean that an employer must provide
notice to the union and the opportunity to bargain before ceasing operations.
ARA Automotive Group (1992) 306 NLRB 610, aff’d without written opinion
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(5th Cir 1993) 990 F2d 1252; Metro Tele-Tronics Corp. v NLRB (1986) 279 NLRB
957, aff’d without written opinion (1987) 819 F2d 1130. Although an employer
has no duty to bargain over its decision to close a portion of its business in certain
situations, it is obligated to bargain about the effects of such a decision as early
as possible. See, e.g., Creasey Co. (1984) 268 NLRB 1425, 1429 (3 days’ notice
was insufficient because union had insufficient opportunity to engage in meaningful
discussions with employer).
The presence of “emergency circumstances” may excuse any advance notice
requirement. See Holly Peterson Co. (1988) 290 NLRB PAGE 172899 (refusing
to say as matter of law that no emergency existed when employer alleged concern
that advance notice would have led to slowdown in production rate or sabotage
to equipment or products); Raskin Packing Co. (1979) 246 NLRB 78 (recognizing
emergency in discontinuance of line of credit); M&M Transp. Co. (1978) 239
NLRB 73 (finding emergency in lack of funds to continue operations). But see
Friedman’s Express, Inc. (1994) 315 NLRB 971 (insufficient evidence to support
emergency circumstances exception when company allegedly failed to obtain
additional capital and suffered abrupt decline in business leading to bankruptcy).
It is the employer’s burden to prove that emergency circumstances exist.
Friedman’s Express, Inc. (1994) 315 NLRB 971; Reeves Bros. (1992) 306 NLRB
610, 612 n15.
§18.67 D. The Duty of Disclosure
An employer’s duty to bargain over the decision or the effects of the decision
carries with it the duty to furnish relevant information requested by the union.
See NLRB v Truitt Mfg. Co. (1956) 351 US 149, 100 L Ed 1027, 76 S Ct 753.
The duty is reciprocal (see Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic
Communications Union (DC Cir 1979) 598 F2d 267), although the majority
of cases involve union requests of employers.
The union typically requests a copy of relevant agreements or contracts (the
employer may edit confidential information), information about accrued vacation
time, the job titles and names of employees to be eliminated, and pay rates.
Refusal to supply information does not constitute an unfair labor practice per se,
but it can be used as evidence of a refusal to bargain in good faith in violation of
NLRA §8(a)(5) (29 USC §158(a)(5)). NLRB v Truitt Mfg. Co. (1956) 351 US 149,
153, 100 L Ed 1027, 76 S Ct 753.
§18.68 E. NLRB-Imposed Remedies
When an employer’s refusal to bargain about its employment decision or the
effects of that decision constitutes an unfair labor practice, the National Labor
Relations Board at a minimum will order the parties to bargain to impasse or
agreement. Back pay, benefits, and injunctive relief may also be ordered. See
generally 29 USC §160.
§18.69 1. Decision Bargaining
When the employer has unlawfully refused to bargain about the decision to
relocate, as well as in instances of discriminatory plant closings or transfers of
work, the NLRB will generally order the employer to resume the status quo ante
and to reinstate discharged employees. Lear Siegler, Inc. (1989) 295 NLRB 857.
The NLRB may decline to order such relief when the employer can show that
it would be “unduly burdensome.” See, e.g., Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co. v NLRB
(9th Cir 1978) 578 F2d 251, 256 (reopening order deemed unduly burdensome
when plant had been dismantled, equipment had been sold piecemeal, reconstruction
would be expensive, and trend in the industry was to subcontract work to
low-cost foreign companies, so that order to reopen would put company at
“a competitive disadvantage within its industry”).
Alternatively, the Board may order the employer to rehire the discharged
employees at the relocated plant, even if that requires displacing existing
employees. Fraser & Johnston Co. v NLRB (9th Cir 1972) 469 F2d 1259, 1266;
Darlington Mfg. Co. v NLRB (4th Cir 1968) 397 F2d 760, 773.The Board also
may order back pay from the date of termination until the parties bargain to an
impasse or the employees secure substantially equivalent employment with the
employer or elsewhere.
§18.70 2. Effects Bargaining
The remedies for refusing to bargain about the effects of a decision are
generally less drastic than those ordered for failure to conduct decision
bargaining. Pursuant to Transmarine Navigation Corp. (1968) 170 NLRB 389, the
NLRB will order back pay from 5 days after its order until:
• The parties reach agreement or impasse; or
• The union fails to bargain in good faith.
See Friedman’s Express, Inc. (1994) 315 NLRB 971; P.J. Hamill Transfer Co. (1985)
277 NLRB 462. If the employer wrongfully refused to make vacation benefit
payments and health, welfare, and pension fund contributions, it may be ordered
to do so and to make employees whole for any losses suffered as a result of the
failure to make payments, plus interest. Friedman’s Express, Inc., supra.
NOTEØThe NLRB has held that penalty payments assessed for violation of the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act may not be credited
against payments required under the National Labor Relations Act as a result
of an employer’s refusal to engage in effects bargaining. Times Herald Printing Co.
(1994) 315 NLRB 700.
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F. Third Party Liability
§18.71 1. Parent-Subsidiary
One company may be liable for the unfair labor practices of another if they
possess the following characteristics that define an integrated enterprise:
• Interrelated operations;
• Common ownership or financial control;
• Common management; and
• Centralized control of labor relations.
See Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v Broadcast Serv. of
Mobile, Inc. (1965) 380 US 255, 13 L Ed 2d 789, 85 S Ct 876; Great Chinese Am.
Sewing Co. v NLRB (9th Cir 1978) 578 F2d 251.
§18.72 2. Effect of Bankruptcy Proceedings
The National Labor Relations Board can enforce an order for failure to engage
in effects bargaining against an employer’s bankruptcy estate. In NLRB v Continental
Hagen Corp. (9th Cir 1991) 932 F2d 828, the court determined that the NLRB
falls within the governmental police or regulatory unit exception to the automatic
stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
§18.73 G. Statute of Limitations
Unfair labor practices are subject to a 6-month statute of limitations. NLRA
§10(b); 29 USC §160(b).When there has been fraudulent concealment of
material facts, however, the limitations period begins to run from the time the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the concealed facts. NLRB v O’Neill
(9th Cir 1992) 965 F2d 1522, 1526.
§18.74 H. Preemption of State Law Claims by
LMRA
State law contract claims are generally preempted under Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA) §301 (29 USC §185). See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v Lueck
(1985) 471 US 202, 218, 85 L Ed 2d 206, 105 S Ct 1904; Harris v Alumax Mill
Prods., Inc. (9th Cir 1990) 897 F2d 400.
State law tort claims may be preempted, depending on the circumstances of the
case. Generally, if the claim requires interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement, it is preempted under LMRA §301. See Lingle v Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc. (1988) 486 US 399, 100 L Ed 2d 410, 108 S Ct 1877. Even when a
state law tort claim does not require interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement, it may fall under the doctrine established in San Diego Bldg.Trades
Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v Garmon (1959) 359 US 236, 245, 3 L Ed
2d 775, 79 S Ct 773. Garmon held that, with certain statutory exceptions,
activities “arguably” protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations
Act are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
A union’s claim that an employer fraudulently induced it to sign a collective
bargaining agreement by assuring employees that their jobs were secure may be
brought as a federal claim under LMRA §301. See International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs,Warehousemen & Helpers v American Delivery Serv. Co. (9th Cir 1995) 50
F3d 770, 773; Milne Employees Ass’n v Sun Carriers, Inc. (9th Cir 1992) 960 F2d
1401, 1407. If alleged under state law, however, the claim generally will be
preempted under Garmon because the employer’s fraud or misrepresentation
constitutes bad faith bargaining in violation of NLRA §8(a)(5) (29 USC §158(a)(5)).
§18.75 VIII. Bankruptcy Issues
Financial difficulties are sometimes the reason for a reduction in force or the
closing of a plant. Consequently, bankruptcy issues must be addressed. In all
but the most routine matters, employers should be advised to consult a specialist
in bankruptcy law. Any action against the employer outside the bankruptcy case
will almost always be prohibited by the “automatic stay” of 11 USC §362.
Deadlines for taking action within the bankruptcy case—or losing rights
irretrievably—can arise very quickly after the filing date, and applicable dates
should be promptly and thoroughly reviewed immediately on learning of a
bankruptcy filing. Deadlines are uniform nationwide for some matters, but vary
by bankruptcy district on other matters. The following discussion applies to
bankruptcy cases filed within the territory of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals;
in some instances case law in other circuits would give different results.
A. Employer Bankruptcy
§18.76 1. Priority for Certain Wages and Benefits Claims
Among unsecured claims against the employer’s bankruptcy estate, wages and
benefits relating to work performed after the date of the bankruptcy filing,
accrued but unpaid, are entitled to second priority as “administrative expenses.”
11 USC §§503(b), 507(a)(2). (These amounts are not subject to the cap described
below for prefiling employee claims.)
Wages, salaries, and commissions earned but not paid within the 90 days before
the date of the employer’s bankruptcy filing or the date on which employer
ceased doing business, whichever is earlier, are given fourth priority behind
“involuntary gap” claims (see 11 USC §§502(f)), but are capped at a maximum
of $10,000 per person. Included in this category are accrued vacation pay, sick
pay, and severance pay. 11 USC §507(a)(4).
If an employee’s termination occurs after performing some work subsequent to
the bankruptcy filing, accrued vacation pay will be allocated between the post-
and prefiling periods (and thus to more and less favorable priority treatment).
Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec.Workers (In re Straus-
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Duparquet, Inc.) (2d Cir 1967) 386 F2d 649 (superseded by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978). Severance pay will similarly be allocated between post- and prefiling,
if based on length of service. If severance pay is paid not according to length of
service, but in lieu of notice of termination, it is considered an administrative
expense under 11 USC §507(a)(2). Lines v System Bd. of Adjustment No. 94, Bhd. of
Railway,Airline & Steamship Clerks (In re Health Maintenance Found.) (9th Cir 1982)
680 F2d 619. If severance pay is paid on some basis remote from either of
these two grounds, bankruptcy courts will evaluate it on a case-by-case basis.
Dullanty v Selectors, Inc. (In re Selectors, Inc.) (BAP 9th Cir 1988) 85 BR 843. Note
that a collective bargaining agreement may be relevant to the treatment of
vacation and severance benefits. See 11 USC §1113; Dullanty v Selectors, Inc., supra.
NOTEØThere is a split of authority on this matter. In adopting the view that
severance pay should be divided into two types—pay at termination in lieu
of notice and pay at termination based on length of service—the Ninth
Circuit follows the First and Third Circuits.This view rejects the Second
Circuit’s view that both types of severance pay constitute administrative
expenses. Dullanty v Selectors, Inc. (In re Selectors, Inc.) (BAP 9th Cir 1988) 85
BR 843. See also In re Pacific Far East Line, Inc. (9th Cir 1983) 713 F2d 476.
§18.77 2. Employee Benefit Plan Contributions
Employer contributions to employee benefit plans, due but unpaid as of the
bankruptcy filing date, are a fourth priority claim. 11 USC §507(a)(4).The
Bankruptcy Code caps those claims at $10,000 for each individual or corporation.
See 11 USC §507(a)(5).This priority does not extend to a carrier’s claims for
unpaid workers’ compensation premiums. Howard Delivery Serv. v Zurich Am. Ins.
Co. (2006) 547 US 651, 165 L Ed 2d 110, 125, 126 S Ct 2105, 2116.
§18.78 3. Retiree Benefits
Medical and death benefit payments to existing retirees must continue to be
paid in an employer’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case unless and until the bankruptcy
court determines that a modification of those benefits is necessary to permit
the employer’s reorganization. 11 USC §1114. A careful review procedure is
provided by the statute, although the ultimate question is whether modification
or rejection of the benefits plan is an economic necessity for the troubled
employer.The employer cannot obtain court approval for a Chapter 11 plan
of reorganization unless the plan provides for the continuation of all retiree
benefits at the prefiling level or at a level approved by the Bankruptcy Court
under 11 USC §1114. 11 USC §1129(a)(13).
§18.79 4. Employee Contract Termination Claims
The Bankruptcy Code limits the amount recoverable by an employee on a
claim based on termination of his or her employment contract to 1 year’s
compensation under the contract (without acceleration), calculated from the
date the bankruptcy petition was filed or the date the employee terminated his
or her performance under the contract, whichever was earlier, plus any unpaid
compensation due on that date. 11 USC §502(b)(7).
§18.80 5. Collective Bargaining Agreements
The terms of a prefiling collective bargaining agreement will continue to apply
after the employer’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing (but not in a Chapter 7
liquidation), unless and until the bankruptcy court approves either a
modification of the terms of the agreement or its rejection. 11 USC §1113.The
statute provides a careful review procedure, the ultimate question being
whether modification or rejection of the agreement is an economic necessity
for the troubled employer.
§18.81 6. Non-NLRA Employment Agreements
Employment agreements not subject to the National Labor Relations Act may
not be performed by an employer after a bankruptcy filing. Such agreements
are subject to rejection as executory contracts under 11 USC §365; damages
for their breach will be treated according to the rules for wage and benefit
claims. See §18.76.
§18.82 7. Labor Union Standing and Plan of
Reorganization
In an employer’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (but not in a liquidation under
Chapter 7), a labor union or association representing the employees has the
right to be heard on a plan of reorganization affecting the employees’ interests,
although the union has no right of appeal. Fed R Bankr P 2018(d). A union
might have standing in its own right, however, if it has a monetary claim against
the employer.
§18.83 8. Nondischargeable Claims
If an employer is an individual, rather than a corporation or partnership,
certain types of claims held by employees may be nondischargeable in the
employer’s bankruptcy. 11 USC §523(c)(1). For example, a claim against an
individual employer for wrongful termination can be held nondischargeable as
a willful, malicious injury. 11 USC §523(a)(6).
§18.84 B. Employee Bankruptcy
A bankruptcy filing by an employee can raise some special issues.The “automatic
stay” of 11 USC §362 will effectively prohibit any legal action to collect a debt
or claim from the employee. Further, an employee may not be terminated by a
public or private employer solely because of the employee’s bankruptcy filing.
11 USC §525. Section 525 does not, however, prevent the employer from
terminating an employee who has merely indicated his or her intent to file for
bankruptcy. Majewski v St. Rose Dominican Hosp. (In re Majewski) (9th Cir 2002)
310 F3d 653.
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In addition, the automatic stay does not prohibit terminating an employee’s
employment for other valid reasons, unless there is an employment contract. If
there is such a contract, the employer should obtain relief from the stay before
attempting to terminate it, even if the contract has an “at-will” termination
clause. See Computer Communications, Inc. v Codex (In re Computer Communications,
Inc.) (9th Cir 1987) 824 F2d 725.
The automatic stay also affects an employer’s ability to enforce a bankrupt
employee’s prefiling obligations under contractual agreements not to disclose
intellectual property. Injunctive relief against disclosure will still be available,
but it must be sought from the bankruptcy court and will be limited to
prospective relief rather than damages.
If an employer has claims against its employee that are tort based in nature
(e.g., misappropriation of trade secrets), those claims may be nondischargeable
in the employee’s bankruptcy. 11 USC §523(c)(1).
WARNINGØA complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt must be
filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors,
unless the time is extended by the bankruptcy court. Fed R Bankr P 4007(c).
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